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Abstract
The space environment around the Earth is populated by more than 130
million objects of 1 mm in size and larger, and future predictions shows that
this amount is destined to increase, even if mitigation measures are imple-
mented at a far better rate than today. These objects can hit and damage
a spacecraft or its components. It is thus necessary to assess the risk level
for a satellite during its mission lifetime. Few software packages perform this
analysis, and most of them employ time-consuming ray-tracing methodology,
where particles are randomly sampled from relevant distributions. In addi-
tion, they tend not to consider the risk associated with the secondary debris
clouds. The paper presents the development of a vulnerability assessment
model, which relies on a fully statistical procedure: the debris fluxes are di-
rectly used combining them with the concept of vulnerable zone, avoiding
the random sampling the debris fluxes. A novel methodology is presented to
predict damage on internal components. It models the interaction between
the components and the secondary debris cloud through basic geometrical
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operations, considering mutual shielding and shadowing between internal
components. The methodologies are tested against state-of-the-art software
for relevant test cases, comparing results on external structures and internal
components.
Keywords: space debris, debris impact, debris cloud, vulnerable zone,
spacecraft vulnerability, penetration probability
1. Introduction
Since the launch of Sputnik 1 in 1957, the space around the Earth and
beyond has been the theatre of remarkable achievements but has also suffered
from continuous exploitation. Decommissioned satellites, spent upper stages,
mission-related objects, and fragments generated by collisions and explosions
of satellites and upper stages have polluted the space environment in the form
of space debris. Space debris is thus considered as a major threat to space
mission; in fact, debris of just 1 cm can cause the break-up of a satellite
(Putzar and Scha¨fer, 2006; Stokes and Swinerd, 2005), and smaller particles
can still have enough energy to produce failures on components critical to
the mission operations and scientific objectives. Recent studies have shown a
constant increase in the population of space debris, and the amount of debris
is expected to keep growing in the next years (Radtke et al., 2017; Lewis
et al., 2017a,b, 2012). The major space-faring nations and international
committees have thus proposed a series of debris mitigation measures to
protect the space environment (O’Connor, 2008; Scha¨fer et al., 2005; Inter-
Agency Space Debris Coordination Committee and Committee, 2007). The
implementation of these mitigation measures can help to mitigate the impact
of human activities on the space environment.
Nonetheless, the danger posed by possible impacts of space debris on
spacecraft structures and components has to be addressed and regarded as
a mission design driver as a single impact can compromise an entire mission
(Grassi et al., 2014; Stokes et al., 2012; Christiansen et al., 2009). This is
particularly important for missions in specific orbital regions, such as highly
inclined orbits, which are more densely populated by space debris and im-
pacts can be more frequent (Liou and Johnson, 2006). The space debris
population accounts for about 29000 objects larger than 10 cm, 750000 ob-
jects between 1 cm to 10 cm, and 166 million objects from 1 mm to 1 cm
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(Space Debris Office, 2017). In Low Earth Orbit (LEO) orbits, only particles
larger than 10 cm can be tracked (Schaub et al., 2015). Consequently, only
for these particles collision avoidance manoeuvres are effective in preventing
damage to satellites. For the other untraceable yet dangerous debris, it is
necessary to adopt specific measures to ensure the mission survivability. To
do so we need to assess the amount of damage caused by space debris to
spacecraft components and identify the most vulnerable ones. Few software
packages are currently available to perform the vulnerability assessment of a
mission. Examples are ESABASE2/DEBRIS (Ga¨de and Miller, 2013), Na-
tional Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) BUMPER (Bjorkman
et al., 2014), European Space Agency (ESA) Debris Risk Assessment and
Mitigation Analysis (DRAMA) (Gelhaus et al., 2014, 2013; Martin et al.,
2005b,a), SHIELD (Stokes et al., 2000; Stokes and Swinerd, 2005; Stokes
et al., 2012), and Particle Impact Risk and Vulnerability Analysis Tool (PI-
RAT) (Gulde et al., 2016; Kempf et al., 2013, 2016). These codes have a
common structure, where the satellite is modelled through a geometric rep-
resentation (which can be more or less detailed). The geometry is usually
schematised through a set of panels. Each panel is then assigned the proper-
ties and characteristics required for the impact analysis, such as the material,
the shielding configuration, the thickness, etc. (Grassi et al., 2014; Ga¨de and
Miller, 2013; Stokes et al., 2000; Welty et al., 2013). An environmental model
(e.g. Meteoroid and Space Debris Terrestrial Environment Reference (MAS-
TER)) is then used to generate the debris fluxes affecting the spacecraft. The
nature and frequency of the impacts on the structure and components of the
spacecraft is evaluated and the damage associated with them is computed
using semi-empirical relationships (i.e. Ballistic Limit Equations). Finally,
the results of the analysis can be obtained in the form of number of impacts,
number of penetrations, impact probability, and penetration probability.
These software packages perform the vulnerability analysis with different
levels of detail and techniques. The two main aspects to be considered are
the modelling of the satellite geometry and the computation of the damage
on internal components. For instance, DRAMA is only used for preliminary
analysis. It only allows the definition of simple geometrical shapes through
a limited number of panels, which are created specifying their area, nor-
mal, and shielding properties. Also, the impact analysis only involves the
outer structure of the satellite and does not consider internal components.
BUMPER instead generates a high-fidelity Finite Element Model (FEM)
of the spacecraft structure; however, it cannot take into account the im-
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pacts on internal components. SHIELD and ESABASE2/DEBRIS both use
a panelised model of the satellite structure, and a ray-tracing methodology
to simulate the impact of debris particle on the spacecraft. They both can
compute the effects of debris impacts on internal components. The method-
ologies used by the two models for this task are, however, very different. In
SHIELD, after the first impact on the external structure, the projectile is con-
sidered still intact and following the same direction of the initial impact. In
ESABASE2/DEBRIS the assessment for internal components is not directly
supported and requires a workaround: the user has to create a panelized rep-
resentation of the internal components, without the external structure. The
contribution of the external structure is then taken into account assigning
a multiple-wall Ballistic Limit Equation (BLE) to each panel constituting
the internal components. A recent integration to this methodology has been
proposed and is under development (Bunte et al., 2017), which considers the
characteristics of the debris cloud that is formed inside the spacecraft after
the first impact. In this methodology, the characteristic distributions relative
to the debris cloud velocity, mass, and spatial distribution are obtained from
available experimental data. The distributions are then sampled to generate
rays representing the cloud fragments. This type of methodology is, however,
time consuming as it requires the generation of thousands of rays and the
verification of the impact with the components for each one of them. Be-
sides, as the rays are generated through sampling, several simulations must
be performed to have statistically meaningful results. Finally, the tool PI-
RAT by the Fraunhofer Institute, also relies on a complete 3D modelling of
the satellite structure and internal components and on the use of environ-
mental models such as MASTER and BUMPER. However, differently from
SHIELD and ESABASE2/DEBRIS, uses a deterministic approach instead of
a probabilistic one (Kempf et al., 2016; Gulde et al., 2016; Welty et al., 2013).
This approach is based on a three-wall geometrical assessment to define threat
directions, which generate the BLE configuration for the components. In par-
ticular, it uses the Schafer-Ryan-Lambert (SRL)-BLE, so that shielding and
partial shielding can be taken into account, as well as primary and secondary
impacts. It has also been applied in the Concurrent Design Facility at ESA
for preliminary vulnerability analyses.
The work presented in this paper is devoted to the introduction of a novel
methodology to assess the penetration probability on internal spacecraft com-
ponents in an intrinsically statistical fashion (Welty et al., 2013) by exploiting
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and extending the concept of vulnerable zones (Putzar and Scha¨fer, 2006).
The need for ray tracing methodology is removed and so is the need for
several Monte Carlo runs to obtain robust results. Also, the implementa-
tion of vulnerable zones is coupled with the formation of secondary ejecta
clouds after the first impact. The methodology relies then on geometrical
operations to compute the interactions of the debris cloud with the internal
components. The presented methodology thus evolves from SHIELD, where
the particle remains intact, by considering the cloud contribution, and avoids
computationally expensive ray-tracing procedure as in Bunte et al. (2017).
The methodology has been developed as a part of a broader study (Trisolini
et al., 2018a,b, 2016, 2015), where a fast assessment of the vulnerability of
simplified spacecraft configurations was required. We first describe the over-
all model developed, for then focusing on the specifics of the computation
of the vulnerability of internal components. The results are then compared
with DRAMA and ESABASE2/DEBRIS for relevant test cases.
2. Model outline
To properly describe the developed methodology, it is important to un-
derstand the entire vulnerability model in all its parts. The model evaluates
the vulnerability of simplified spacecraft configurations, considering the ef-
fects on both the external structure and on the internal components (Trisolini
et al., 2018a,b). It takes as inputs the spacecraft configuration, the mission
scenario, and the debris fluxes from a space environment model, and returns
the impact and penetration probability on the external structure and inter-
nal components. The main novelties in the model are the schematization
of the debris environment through vector flux elements (Section 2.2.1), the
implementation of a statistical methodology to compute the impact and pen-
etration probabilities through the use of vulnerable zones (Section 3.2), and
the development of a fully geometrical methodology for the assessment of the
mutual shielding between internal components (Section 4) without relying on
ray tracing methodologies.
2.1. Spacecraft configuration
The spacecraft configuration is defined through a set of elementary shapes
such as boxes, cylinders, spheres, and panels. For each element in the con-
figuration, its main properties must be provided, such as the shape, the size,
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the mass, and the position inside the spacecraft. An example of the con-
figuration entries is provided in Table 1; the main body of the satellite is
always the first entry and is positioned at the centre of the reference frame.
The x -axis points towards the direction of the orbital velocity (RAM direc-
tion), the z -axis points away from the Earth, and the y-axis follows from the
right-hand rule.
Table 1: Example of spacecraft configuration structure used by the model.
ID Name Shape m l r w h Pos.
(kg) (m) (m) (m) (m) (m)
0 Spacecraft Box 2000 3.5 n/a 1.5 1.5 n/a
1 Tank Sphere 15 n/a 0.55 n/a n/a (-1,0,0)
2 BattBox Box 5 0.6 n/a 0.5 0.4 (0,0,1)
... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ...
The satellite structure can be defined with a single material and a uni-
form thickness; alternatively, different materials, thickness, and shielding
types can be assigned to each face. Three types of shielding can be used in
the current version of the model: single wall shields, Whipple shields, and
honeycomb sandwich panels (Ryan and Christiansen, 2010). For the internal
components, the position must be specified; the components can be free in-
side the main structure, or they can be attached to the external panels. The
orientation of a component can also be specified, but only along the main
axes of the satellite (x, y, and z ). Once the geometry of the spacecraft has
been finalised, the software extracts all the relevant information needed for
the vulnerability assessment, such as the shield type, the stand-off distances,
the vulnerable zones extents, etc. Using this information together with the
vector flux elements (Section 2.2.1), and the ballistic limit equations (Section
4.2), the vulnerability of each internal component can be computed.
2.2. Space environment model
To assess the impact of space debris on a satellite, it is necessary to
know the characteristics of the environment the satellite has to face during
its lifetime. The characteristics and number of debris particles impacting a
spacecraft are dependent upon the mission scenario, mainly its altitude and
inclination. The present model uses ESA MASTER 2009 (Flegel et al., 2009;
Gelhaus et al., 2011) to obtain the description of the debris environment via
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flux predictions on user-defined target orbits (Trisolini et al., 2018a). The
fluxes provide the number of particles per unit area per year that impact
the spacecraft, given the specific mission scenario (i.e. orbital parameters).
The distributions needed for the survivability computation are the flux vs
particle diameter, flux vs impact elevation, flux vs impact elevation vs impact
azimuth, and the flux vs impact velocity vs impact azimuth. This set of
distributions is sufficient to perform the spacecraft vulnerability analysis.
Fig. 2 and 1 represent an example of the flux distributions given by MASTER,
where the differential flux as a function of the impact velocity and impact
azimuth and the cumulative flux as a function of the particle diameter are
presented. The fluxes refer to a Sun-synchronous orbit (SSO) with semi-
major axis of 7185 km, eccentricity of 0.001, and inclination of 98◦ for one
year with starting epoch 1st May 2009.
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Figure 1: Example of MASTER-2009 cumulative flux vs particle diameter distribution.
Orbit characteristics: a = 7185 km, e = 0.001, i = 98◦. Epoch: 1st May 2009. Mission
lifetime: 1 year
2.2.1. Vector Flux Elements
Despite MASTER-2009 provides the description of the debris environ-
ment through fluxes, this information cannot be directly used in the compu-
tation of the vulnerability of a spacecraft. In fact, assessing the criticality
of the impact of a debris fragment requires the knowledge of the particle
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Figure 2: Example of MASTER-2009 differential flux vs impact azimuth vs impact velocity
distribution.
diameter, velocity, and direction. These data can be obtained by directly
sampling the flux distributions provided by MASTER to generate a set of
impacting particles, which are shot towards the satellite. This procedure is at
the core of ray tracing methods, which are computationally expensive and re-
quire a large number of simulations in order to be statistically robust (Stokes
et al., 2000; Stokes and Swinerd, 2005). The methodology implemented in
this work, instead, follows a novel approach to bypass the use of such com-
putationally expensive procedures, and at the same time have a sufficiently
accurate description of the debris environment. The compromise is achieved
by characterising the debris environment surrounding the spacecraft with
vector flux elements. The role of vector flux elements is to summarise the
information relative to a specific angular sector of space around the satel-
lite (expressed in terms of impact azimuth and elevation) as provided by
MASTER-2009. In fact, each vector element is associated with a value of
the particle flux, particle diameter, impact velocity, and impact direction
(Fig. 3) and these values are then used for the entire sector.
The complete procedure to generate the vector flux elements is described
in detail in Trisolini et al. (2018a). In summary, it consists of subdividing the
space around the satellite into a set of angular sectors of impact azimuth and
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Figure 3: Vector flux elements representation. In this example each vector carries the
value of the impact velocity for the angular sector it is referred to.
elevation. Then, for each angular sector, the diameter, the impact velocity,
and the impact direction are extracted from the MASTER-2009 distribu-
tions. As in each angular sector these quantities have a distribution and
not a single value, we need to use a criterion to select the value to be as-
sociated to the vector flux element. The criterion we use is the weighted
average of the quantity of interest, using as weights the corresponding values
of the particle fluxes. For a generic quantity x, inside the angular sector
[Azi, Azi+1;Eli, Eli+1] we thus have
x¯ij =
∑M
k=1 xkϕk∑M
k=1 ϕk
i ∈ {1, ..., NAz}; j ∈ {1, ..., NEl}; (1)
where x¯ij is the weighted average value of the quantity x referred to the
ij angular sector, ϕk is the value of the flux corresponding to the quantity
xk, which is obtained from a histogram equivalent to the one of Fig. 1 but
limited to the considered angular sector, and M is the number of subdivisions
used to obtain the flux histogram from MASTER-2009. NAz, and NEl are
the number of angular sector subdivision for the azimuth and the elevation
angle respectively. Using this procedure for all the quantities of interest we
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obtain a vector in the form of Eq. (2), which represents all the properties
defining a vector flux element referred to an angular sector.
f ij =
[
ϕ¯ij v¯p,ij A¯zij E¯lij d¯p,ij
]
(2)
The use of the schematisation introduced by the vector flux elements aims
at simplifying the computation and have a computationally efficient proce-
dure. In fact, with this, we can limit the number of times we check for
penetration using BLEs and, in particular, the number of geometrical oper-
ations that are required to assess the contribution of the clouds associated
to the secondary ejecta. A better precision could be achieved directly using
the binned output generated by MASTER-2009. However, this would come
at the cost of a higher computational time.
2.3. Ballistic Limit Equations
When debris particles hit a spacecraft, the type of impact and its ef-
fects need to be assessed. Such an assessment is performed using a set of
experimentally derived analytical expressions referred to as Ballistic Limit
Equations (BLEs) (Ryan and Christiansen, 2010, 2011; Christiansen et al.,
2009; Scha¨fer et al., 2005). Given the impact speed, the impact angle, the
projectile density, and the target characteristics, BLEs allow the computation
of the critical particle diameter, which is the minimum diameter an impact-
ing particle must have to produce damage on the specified target. In general,
BLEs have different expressions as a function of the type of impact. Three
different types of impacts are distinguished depending on the relative impact
velocity: ballistic, hypervelocity, and shatter regime (Ryan and Christiansen,
2010; Ryan et al., 2008; Ryan and Christiansen, 2011). The expressions for
the BLEs are further divided by the shielding type: single-wall, double-wall,
triple-wall, and advanced shielding concepts all have dedicated expressions
(Ryan and Christiansen, 2010). Single-wall BLEs are subdivided accord-
ing to the material of the shield, from classical metallic materials such as
aluminium, titanium, and stainless steel, to Carbon Fibre Reinforced Plas-
tics (CFRP), fibreglass, glass, and polycarbonate. Dual-wall shields include
two main configurations: the standard metallic Whipple shield (Ryan and
Christiansen, 2010), and the Honeycomb Sandwich Panel (HC-SP) (Ryan
et al., 2008). A commonly used triple-wall BLE for the analysis of space-
craft vulnerability is the SRL equation Eqs. (3-4) (Scha¨fer et al., 2008; Ryan
et al., 2008; Putzar and Scha¨fer, 2006; Grassi et al., 2014; Welty et al., 2013).
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The SRL BLE allows the computation of the critical diameter for equipment
placed inside the main structure of a satellite by considering the last plate
of the triple-wall configuration as the face of the target equipment (Putzar
and Scha¨fer, 2006). As this BLE is versatile and can be used for internal
components, we will use it for the reminder of the work. The expression of
the SRL BLE for the ballistic regime (vp ≤ VLV · cos θ) is
dc,b =
[ 1
K3S
· (t0.5w + tb) · (σy40)0.5 + tob
0.6 · ( cos θ)δ · ρ0.5p · v2/3p
]18/19
(3)
where vp is the particle velocity relative to the spacecraft, ρp is the particle
density, θ is the impact angle (angle between the relative velocity vector and
the normal to the impacted surface), VLV is the ballistic regime transition
velocity, K3S and δ are fitting factors whose values are summarised in Table
A.7, tb is the bumper plate thickness, tob is the outer bumper thickness, tw is
the rear wall thickness, and σy is the yield strength of the rear wall material.
In the hypervelocity regime (vp ≥ VHV · cos θ) instead we have
dc,h =
1.155 ·
[
S
1/3
1 ·
(
tb +Ktw · tw
)2/3
+KS2 · Sβ2 · tγw
(
cos θ
)−] · (σy
70
)1/3
K
2/3
3D · ρ1/3p · ρ1/9ob · v2/3p ·
(
cos θ
)δ
(4)
where VHV is the hypersonic regime transition velocity. Ktw, KS2, K3D,
β, , and γ are fitting factors (Table A.7); ρob is the outer bumper density; S1
and S2 are the spacing between the outer bumper and the bumper plate, and
the space between the bumper plate and the rear wall respectively. Finally,
in the shatter regime (VLV · cos θ ≤ vp ≤ VHV · cos θ) a linear interpolation
is used between the critical diameters obtained in the ballistic and in the
hypervelocity regimes. The SRL BLE has been used throughout this work for
the computation of the critical diameter for impacts on components insides
the spacecraft. Single-wall and dual-wall BLEs can also be used by the model
to predict impact damage on external structures and components.
2.4. Impact and penetration probability assessment
The procedure for the computation of the impact probability (Pimp) and
penetration probability (Ppen) depends on the characteristics of the environ-
ment surrounding the satellite that are the particle flux, velocity, direction,
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and diameter. In addition, the orientation of the surface considered plays an
important role as it influences the area that is visible by a specific vector flux
element. Finally, even the mission lifetime is an important parameter to be
considered as the more a spacecraft resides in a specific debris environment,
the more it will be exposed to the debris fluxes. The outline of the procedure
is presented in Fig. 4 and the detailed description can be found in Trisolini
et al. (2018b).
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Figure 4: Flow diagram for the vulnerability computation.
To evaluate the impact and penetration probabilities, the structure of the
spacecraft is schematised as a set of panels. For each panel, it is necessary
to check which vector flux element can actually impact the panel. This is
achieved using a simple visibility which checks that vi · nj < 0, where vi is
the i -th vector flux element and nj is the normal to the j -th panel in the
set. If a vector flux element impacts the panel, its contribution to the overall
impact probability is then evaluated. By using Poisson statistics that is by
assuming that debris impact events are statistically independent, the impact
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probability of a vector flux element on an a panel can be expressed as
P ijimp = 1− exp
(
− ϕi · Sij ·∆T
)
(5)
where ϕi is the flux associated to the i -th vector flux element, Sij is the
projected area of the j -th face on the direction of the i -th vector flux element,
and ∆T is the mission time in years. For the computation of the penetration
probability, the classic approach involving BLEs can be adopted (Kuiper
et al., 2010; Reimerdes and Wohlers, 2001; Welty et al., 2013; Stokes et al.,
2000; Grassi et al., 2014; Bunte et al., 2009; Stokes et al., 2012). Substituting
into the relevant BLE the velocity and direction of the vector flux elements,
the critical diameters are computed. The critical diameter is then used to
compute the corresponding critical flux i.e. the particle flux corresponding
to diameters greater than the critical diameter.
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Figure 5: Graphical representation of the methodology for the computation of the critical
flux. Orbit characteristics: a = 7185 km, e = 0.001, i = 98◦. Epoch: 1st May 2009.
Mission lifetime: 1 year
To compute the critical flux, we use the MASTER-2009 distribution of
the cumulative flux vs particle diameter, from where the it can be extracted
(Fig. 5). Finally, the expression for the penetration probability is given by
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P ijpen = 1− exp
(
− ϕc,i · Sij ·∆T
)
(6)
where ϕc,i is the critical flux associated to the i -th vector flux element.
It is important to highlight the simplification introduced with this pro-
cedure: as the global distribution of cumulative flux vs diameter is used for
computing the critical diameter, the obtained flux is the overall flux for the
entire range of azimuth and elevation angles. This flux cannot be directly
used to compute the penetration probability associated to a single vector flux
element as to each one of them is associated a value of the particle flux that is
dependent upon the directionality, i.e. impact elevation and impact azimuth.
It is thus assumed that the shape of the curve describing the relation between
the particle flux and the particle diameter maintains the same shape through
the different values of impact azimuth and impact elevation. By doing so,
we obtain the critical flux for a vector flux element as a fraction of the total
critical flux, which is proportional to the flux associated to that particular
vector flux element. With this assumption, the critical flux associated to a
vector flux element can be computed as follows
ϕc,i = ϕi · ϕc
ϕtot
(7)
where ϕtot is the total debris flux and ϕc is the overall critical flux as
extracted from Fig. 5. Figs. 6 and 7 show the distribution of the particle flux
for the particle diameter and the impact azimuth and elevation respectively.
From these maps can be better observed that the assumption is not always
satisfied: there are regions where the inverse exponential trend of the overall
particle flux with the diameter (Fig. 5) is maintained. In these regions, the
scaling assumption can be reasonable; however, it is less accurate for other
regions. The simplified nature of the proposed method is aligned with the
introduced simplification; nonetheless, future development of the methodol-
ogy will revise this assumption, including a more accurate determination of
the critical flux.
Finally, the overall impact and penetration probabilities (Eqs. (8) and (9)
can be computed iterating over the entire set of vector flux elements and
spacecraft panels as follows:
Pimp = 1−
Npanels∏
j=1
(
Nfluxes∏
i=1
(
1− P ijimp
))
(8)
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Figure 6: Particle flux vs Impact elevation vs Object diameter. Orbit characteristics: a =
7185 km, e = 0.001, i = 98◦. Epoch: 1st May 2009. Mission lifetime: 1 year
Figure 7: Particle flux vs Impact elevation vs Object diameter. Orbit characteristics: a =
7185 km, e = 0.001, i = 98◦. Epoch: 1st May 2009. Mission lifetime: 1 year
Ppen = 1−
Npanels∏
j=1
(
Nfluxes∏
i=1
(
1− P ijpen
))
(9)
where Nfluxes is the total number of vector flux elements and Npanels is
the total number of panels composing the structure considered. The outlined
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procedure is general and can be used for both the external structure of the
spacecraft and for the internal components, provided the relevant changes
are taken into account. Section 3 provides a detailed description of such cor-
rections with the complete procedure for the assessment of the vulnerability
of internal components.
3. Vulnerability of internal components
For a complete vulnerability assessment, it is also necessary to consider
the effects on internal components. When a debris particle with sufficient
size and velocity impacts the outer structure of the spacecraft, a secondary
debris cloud is usually generated (Putzar and Scha¨fer, 2006; Depczuk and
Schonberg, 2003). The particles belonging to this secondary cloud can impact
the internal components; therefore, it is necessary to evaluate the probability
that the secondary ejecta have to damage internal components. This can
be achieved through a fully statistical procedure based on the concept of
vulnerable zones (Trisolini et al., 2018b; Putzar and Scha¨fer, 2006; Welty
et al., 2013), where the vulnerability of an internal component (Vcomp) can
be expressed as the product of three different contributions as follows
Vcomp = Pstruct · Pcloud · PBLE (10)
where Pstruct is the probability of space debris hitting the spacecraft ex-
ternal structure inside the vulnerable zone relative to the target component,
Pcloud is the probability that the secondary cloud ejecta will hit the compo-
nent, and PBLE is the probability that the particles in this cloud perforate
the component wall. Fig. 8 shows the schematics of the entire procedure.
3.1. Impact propagation
Understanding how debris impacts propagate inside the spacecraft plays
a crucial role in modelling and predicting the damage received by internal
components due to secondary debris ejecta. Experimental campaigns on
very high-speed impacts have shown a considerable difference between bal-
listic and hypervelocity behaviour. In the former case, the projectile stays
almost intact after the impact and keeps propagating in a direction that al-
most coincides with the impact direction. In the latter case, instead, both the
projectile and the impacted plate suffer a fragmentation, which produces two
secondary clouds of debris (Fig. 9) (Schonberg, 2001; Depczuk and Schon-
berg, 2003). One cloud exits almost perpendicularly to the impacted wall
16
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Figure 8: Flow diagram for the vulnerability computation of an internal component.
and is referred to as the normal debris cloud. The second cloud instead fol-
lows more closely the direction of the projectile and is identified as the inline
debris cloud. It is assumed that the debris belonging to these clouds remains
contained inside conic surfaces so that their behaviour can be modelled using
only the characteristics of the cone (i.e. the direction of the cone axis and
the spread angle of the cone). Eqs. (11-14) describes the relation between the
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Figure 9: Geometry of secondary cloud ejecta.
characteristics of the impact (impact velocity, impact angle, particle diame-
ter, and wall material) and geometry of the cones (Schonberg, 2001; Depczuk
and Schonberg, 2003).
θ1
θ
= 0.471 ·
(vp
C
)−0.049
·
( ts
dp
)−0.054
· cos (θ)1.134 (11)
θ2
θ
= 0.532 ·
(vp
C
)−0.086
·
( ts
dp
)−0.478
· cos (θ)0.586 (12)
tan η1 = 1.318 ·
(vp
C
)0.907
·
( ts
dp
)0.195
· cos (θ)0.394 (13)
tan η2 = 1.556 ·
(vp
C
)1.096
·
( ts
dp
)0.345
· cos (θ)0.738 (14)
where θ is the impact angle, θ1 is the deflection angle of the normal debris
cloud, θ2 is the deflection angle of the inline debris cloud, η1 is the half-cone
angle of the normal cloud, η2 is the half-cone angle of the inline cloud. ts is
the impacted plane thickness, C is the speed of sound of the plate material,
dp is the particle diameter, and vp is the relative particle impact velocity.
3.2. Vulnerable zones
The vulnerable zone (Putzar and Scha¨fer, 2006) is defined as the area
on the external structure of the spacecraft that, if impacted, can lead to an
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impact also on the considered component (Fig. 10). Any impact of a particle
onto this area generates fragments that may hit the component in question,
with a probability that depends on the geometry of the impact (secondary
debris ejecta characteristics, stand-off distance, and shielding from other com-
ponents). The lateral extent of the vulnerable zone (lvz) is expressed as
lvz = 2 ·
(
s · tanαmax + 1
2
· (dtarget + dp,max)) (15)
where s is the spacing between the structure wall and the component front
face (stand-off distance), dtarget is the lateral extent of the target compo-
nent (the component of which we are evaluating the vulnerability), dp,max
is the maximum projectile diameter, and αmax is the maximum ejection an-
gle, which has a value of 63.15 degrees (Putzar and Scha¨fer, 2006). The
parameter dp,max instead represents a user-defined value for the extent of the
particle diameter, which takes into account the contribution of the particle
to the impact probability. Suggested values for dp,max are 10 mm for vulner-
able components and 20 mm for components with higher impact resistance
(Putzar and Scha¨fer, 2006). Fig. 11 shows a visual example of the vulnerable
zones for a box-shaped component inside a cubic structure. The cyan regions
represent the projection of the vulnerable zones extensions onto the external
structure.
Target plane
Structure wall
Projectile θ
θ1
θ2
η1
αmax
dtarget
s
lvz / 2
η2
Figure 10: Representation of the lateral extension of the vulnerable zone.
3.3. Penetration probability of internal components
As previously introduced in Eq. (10), the computation of the penetration
probability on an internal component is subdivided into the computation
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Figure 11: Vulnerable zones of a box projected onto the faces of a cubic structure (the
vulnerable zone of the back face is omitted for clarity).
of three different contributions. The first contribution, P ijstruct, is calculated
following the procedure outlined in Section 2.4. However, in this case, the
surface to be considered is the one delimited by the vulnerable zone (Fig. 11).
The resulting expression is
P ijstruct = 1− exp
(− ϕi · Sijvz ·∆T) (16)
where P ijstruct is the impact probability on the j -th vulnerable zone by the i -th
vector flux element. ϕi is the flux relative to the i -th vector flux element,
Sijvz is the projected area of the j -th vulnerable zone relative to the target
component along the direction of the i -th vector flux element ; and ∆T is
the mission time in years. When a particle hits the vulnerable zone, it does
not necessarily mean that the downrange fragments will damage the target
component. The second term in Eq. (10) takes this into account. To prop-
erly compute this contribution, it is necessary to consider the three different
impact regimes (ballistic, hypervelocity, and shutter) separately; in fact, they
lead to different geometries for the impact ejecta and require different ex-
pressions for the assessment of the critical diameter (Section 2.3). In case of
an hypervelocity impact, the probability to impact the target component is
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computed as the ratio between the extent of the cloud ejecta at the target
component plane and the extent of the vulnerable zone of the component
(Putzar and Scha¨fer, 2006). The resulting expression is given by
P ijcloud,h =
dijejecta
lvz,j
(17)
where P ijcloud,h is the probability that the cloud relative to the i -th vector
flux element, which has already impacted the j -th vulnerable zone, will hit
the target component, lvz, j is the extent of the j -th vulnerable zone in the
target plane, and dijejecta is the extent of the debris ejecta at the target plane
relative to the j -th vulnerable zone (Fig. 10), which is expressed as
dijejecta = 2 ·
(
tanα
(
θij
) · sj + 1/2 · dtarget,j) (18)
where sj is the stand-off distance between the component and the external
wall to which the j -th vulnerable zone is associated, dtarget,j is the extent of
the target component along the direction of the j -th vulnerable zone, and
α(θij) is the ejection angle associated with the i -th vector flux element im-
pacting on the j -th vulnerable zone, and can be computed with the following
expression
α(θ) = θ2 +
η2
2
(19)
which is obtained simplifying Eqs. (11-14), assuming that the ejection and
spread angles are only a function of the impact angle θ and that all the other
parameters can be absorbed by a constant factor (Putzar and Scha¨fer, 2006).
In case of an impact in the ballistic regime, as no fragmentation occurs, only
the size of the projectile needs to be taken into account.
P ijcloud,b =
dijtarget + d
ij
p
lvz,j
(20)
where dijp is the particle diameter relative to the i -th vector flux element im-
pacting on the j -th vulnerable zone. This value is the most probable particle
diameter for the i -th vector flux element (Section 2.2.1) and is extracted from
the debris flux distributions from MASTER-2009. For the scatter regime, a
linear interpolation (Eq. (21)) between the hypervelocity regime (Eq. (17))
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and the ballistic regime (Eq. (20)) is adopted.
P ijcloud,s = P
ij
cloud,b +
(
vijp − VLV
VHV − VLV
)
· P ijcloud,h (21)
The value of Pcloud used in Eq. (10) is then selected as follows
P ijcloud =

P ijcloud,b if vp ≤ VLV · cos θ
P ijcloud,h if vp ≥ VHV · cos θ
P ijcloud,s otherwise
(22)
Finally, the last contribution in Eq. (10) is related to the computation of the
penetration probability on the front face of the target component. Similarly,
the contribution can be expressed as
P ijBLE = 1− exp
(− ϕc,i · Svz,ij ·∆T) (23)
where P ijBLE is the penetration probability for the j -th vector flux element
on the component associated with the i -th vulnerable zone, and ϕc,i is the
critical flux that is the flux associated to the value of the critical diameter
computed with BLEs. As specified in Section 2.3, we adopted the SRL BLE
to compute the critical diameter relative to the target component. It is
always assumed that the last wall of the shielding configuration corresponds
to the face of the target component, while the other walls are representative
of the outer structure. The overall vulnerability of an internal component
can then be expressed as
Vcomp = 1−
Npanels∏
j=1
(
Nfluxes∏
i=1
(
1− P ijstruct · P ijcloud · P ijBLE
))
(24)
4. Mutual shielding methodology
The vulnerable zone methodology as described in Section 3 lacks the ca-
pability of considering the mutual shielding between components. In fact,
Eqs. (29) and (31) do not take into account the contribution of possible
shadowing between the components, where additional shielding is provided,
preventing part if not all the secondary debris ejecta from impacting them.
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This is especially important considering the directional nature of the space
debris fluxes. For example, impacts coming from the RAM direction are
more dangerous than from other directions because of a higher relative ve-
locity. As the vulnerable zone approach has its simplicity and the possibility
to avoid time-consuming Monte Carlo simulations among its advantages, the
idea is to extend this approach by integrating a methodology that allows
the evaluation of the mutual shielding while still maintaining the advantages
of the original approach. Among the three different contributions to the
vulnerability (Eq. (10)), the second term (associated with the impact prob-
ability of the ejecta on the component) is the one connected to the mutual
shielding. The idea is to consider the interaction between the debris cone
developed after the impact and the shielding elements interposed between
the outer faces and the component in a purely geometrical way. To do so,
we first consider the nature of the impacts on the spacecraft structure. In
the standard vulnerable zone approach, a particle can impact anywhere on
the vulnerable zone (no impact location is sampled or specified). The lack of
a precise impact location results in an issue connected to the assessment of
the mutual shielding. In fact, the shadowing between components depends
on the impact location and on the characteristic of the debris produced after
the impact. In case of a hypervelocity impact, a cone of debris is generated;
depending on the cone axis and aperture angle, and on the impact location,
different areas of the target component may be visible and different portions
of the debris cone can be shielded by the interposing components. To over-
come this issue it was decided to discretize the vulnerable zone using a grid
(Fig. 12). As there must not be a preferred impact location, for each vector
flux element, an impact is simulated assuming the centre of each cell in the
grid to represent the impact location. At this point, for each impact location,
the resulting debris cone is generated and its interaction with the target and
the shielding components is evaluated. The overall effect of a vector flux
element impacting the considered vulnerable zone is then obtained averaging
the contribution of each cell in the grid. The procedure is then repeated for
each vector flux element and each vulnerable zone. In the case of a ballis-
tic impact, the procedure must change. In this case, the projectile passes
through in the same direction of the impact vector, and no secondary debris
is produced.
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Target component
Vulnerable zone
Grid
Cell impact point
Figure 12: Representation of the vulnerable zone grid and of the cell impact locations.
4.1. Hypervelocity regime
After a hypervelocity impact, the impacting particle is destroyed together
with the area of the panel subject to the impact, and two secondary clouds
of fragments are generated (Section 3.1). In the standard vulnerable zone
formulation (Section 3.2), the extent of the vulnerable zone is defined using a
single conical shape (Eq. (15)). To maintain this approach, the two secondary
clouds are merged into a single conical shape. The characteristics of the cone
(i.e. its axis and aperture angle) are determined using Eqs. (11-14). The
cone half-aperture angle (η) can be computed as follows:
η =
1
2
· (θ2 − θ1) + 1
4
· (η1 + η2) (25)
The axis of the cone is the bisector of the aperture angle and belongs to the
impact plane, which is the plane containing the impact vector flux element
and the normal to the impacted face (Fig. 13). It is oriented of an angle
equal to η− θ1 with respect to the vector normal to the external plane. The
impact plane defines the interaction between the debris cone and the target
plane, which is used to define the debris cone section at the impact plane
(Fig. 14). In fact, it is used to determine the position and orientation of the
debris cone section: the intersection of the axis of the cone and the target
24
plane is the centre of ellipse and the line belonging to the impact plane and
perpendicular to the cone axis will be its semi-major axis. The cone obtained
is then used to determine the impact probability on the target component.
To do so, the interaction of the debris cone with the target object and the
shielding components must be evaluated.
External panel
Impact plane
Cone axis
Figure 13: Representation of the cone aperture angle in the impact plane.
The standard approach computes the impact probability by adding the
extent of the target section to the extent of the debris cone in the target
plane (Eq. (17)). This mechanism is extended here, and the mutual shielding
is accounted for in both the debris cone and of the target section. For the
debris cone, a perspective projection of the components onto the target plane
is carried out and the intersection of these projections with the section of the
cone at the target plane is performed (Fig. 14).
The area used in the computation is then the residual area of the cone
after the shielding component projections have been subtracted. This area
is referred to as the available cone area Ac,av. For each vector flux element,
this area is evaluated over all the grid cells subdividing the vulnerable zone.
Akc,av = A
k
c¬
(
Aks,1, ..., A
k
s,n, ..., A
k
s,Ns
)
, k ∈ {1, ..., Ncell}; (26)
where Akc is the intersection (¬) between the k -th debris cone with the
target plane, Aks,n is the perspective projection of the n-th shielding com-
ponent onto the target plane with respect to the k -th grid cell, Ns is the
number of shielding components between the target component and the j -th
vulnerable zone, and Ncell is the number of cells subdividing the vulnerable
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Target plane
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Target component
Figure 14: Mutual shielding in the hypervelocity regime.
zone. The procedure is repeated for each grid cell and the result averaged
in order to obtain the average available cone area relative to the i -th vector
flux element impacting the j -th vulnerable zone (A¯ijc,av)
A¯ijc,av =
1
Ncell
·
Ncell∑
k=1
Akc,av (27)
As the projection of the components and the cone section at the target
plane can both exceed the limits of the spacecraft envelope, all the computed
areas are cropped with respect to the limits of the target plane, which is
limited by the external structure of the spacecraft. All the boolean operations
such as intersection and difference between the projected areas have been
performed using the Python package Shapely (Gillies et al., 2007–). The
second contribution in the vulnerable zone equation is the target component
length (Eq. (15)). In this extension of the methodology, the visible target area
is computed by performing a Boolean difference between the target section
and the perspective projection of the shielding components onto the target
plane (Fig. 15). Again, the operation is repeated over each grid cell, and
the average over the overall grid is carried out to evaluate the average target
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visible area (Aijt,av) as follows:
A¯ijt,av =
1
Ncell
·
Ncell∑
k=1
[
At¬
(
Aks,1, ..., A
k
s,n, ..., A
k
s,Ns
)]
(28)
The impact probability associated to the i -th vector flux element impacting
on the j -th vulnerable zone for the hypervelocity regime is then obtained
with the following expression
P ijcloud,h =
A¯ijt,av + A¯
ij
c,av
Avz,j
(29)
where Avz,j is the area of the j-th vulnerable zone.
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Target plane
External panel
Shielding component
projection
Shielding component
Visible target area
Target component
Figure 15: Perspective projection of a shielding component onto the target plane.
4.2. Ballistic regime
In case of a ballistic impact, the projectile passes through the panel with-
out being destroyed. Therefore, no ejecta are produced and the consequence
of the impact cannot be schematized with a debris cone. Instead, for each
vector flux element and impact point on the vulnerable zone grid, a line is
generated with a vertex on the centre of the cell and direction equivalent to
the one of the vector flux element (Fig. 16). This line represents the tra-
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Figure 16: Trajectory of the vector flux elements after a ballistic impact.
jectory of the debris after the impact. The interaction of this line with the
target component and the shielding components is then evaluated. Again,
this is to maintain the analogy with the standard formulation. The variables
that need to be considered are the particle size and the target area. It is
assumed that the particle is not affected during the impact, maintaining its
shape (spherical) and dimension. The equivalence is obtained by using the
cross-section of the particle (Eq. (30)).
Ap,i = 1/4 · pi · d2p,i (30)
where dp,i is the sample particle diameter associated with the i -th vector flux
element. For the target section, the same procedure used in the hypervelocity
case is adopted and the computation of the average target visible area is
performed using Eq. (28). Finally, the impact probability in the ballistic
case is given as
P ijcloud,b =
A¯ijt,av + Ap,i
Avz,j
(31)
Eqs. (29) and (31) can be used inside Eq. (24) to compute the impact prob-
ability of an internal component.
4.3. Equivalence with standard vulnerable zone formulation
Sections 4.1 and 4.2 describe the methodology for assessing the contri-
bution of shielding components through a procedure that relies on the use
of areas, as this is the more natural way of considering such contribution.
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However, the standard vulnerable zone formulation adopts an approach that
uses the linear extension of the vulnerable zone and of the target component
(Section 3.2). As the developed methodology aims at extending the standard
formulation, Eqs. (29) and (31) have been converted into a linearised version
as follows
P ijcomp,h =
d¯ ijt,av + d¯
ij
c,av
lvz,j
(32)
P ijcomp,b =
d¯ ijt,av + dp,i
lvz,j
(33)
where d¯t,av and d¯c,av maintain the same meaning. The conversions from
the areas to the equivalent length is carried out using the following simplified
expression
d = 2 ·
√
A/pi (34)
For completeness, both the methodology using the areas (Eqs. (29) and (31))
and the one using the equivalent linear extent (Eqs. (32) and (33)) have been
tested and compared with state-of-the-art software packages. The results are
presented in Section 5.
4.4. Correction factor methodology
The previously described methodology captures the geometrical proper-
ties of the impact phenomenon and its propagation inside the spacecraft
structure; however, it still requires a computational time that is not applica-
ble to a multi-objective optimisation framework (around 6 seconds for a con-
figuration with two internal components for a Python implementation). As
the presented model is meant to be used inside a multi-objective optimisation
framework, its execution speed is of paramount importance. Consequently,
a simplified methodology has be developed, which still takes into account
the mutual shielding, while reducing the large number of expensive geomet-
rical operations needed for the complete procedure of Sections 4.1 and 4.2.
The method described in this section consists in applying a correction fac-
tor whenever one or more components cover the target component. This
approach maintains the simplicity and the short computational time of the
standard one while providing a consistent way to account for the reduced im-
29
pact probability caused by the mutual shielding. Given the different nature
of the impacts in the hypervelocity and in the ballistic regime, two correction
factors are used. In the case of the hypervelocity regime, it computes the
portion of the vulnerable zone that can actually lead to an impact onto the
target component. This is the part of the vulnerable zone that is not covered
by the perspective projections of the shielding components. As these pro-
jections depend on the impact point, even in this case the vulnerable zone
is subdivided into a grid and each grid cell centre is an impact point for
the vector flux element. The procedure is analogous to the one described in
Section 4.1; however, in this case, the perspective projections of the shielding
components onto the target plane (Fig. 14) are directly subtracted from the
vulnerable zone area. This methodology avoids generating the cone of the
secondary debris ejecta and performing its intersection with the target plane
that is the most computationally expensive part of the procedure. Eq. (35)
gives the expression for the available vulnerable zone area A¯ijvz,av relative to
the j -th vulnerable zone and the can be computed again averaging over the
contributions computed for each grid cell.
A¯ijvz,av =
1
Ncell
·
Ncell∑
k=1
[
Ajvz¬
(
Aks,1, ..., A
k
s,n, ..., A
k
s,Ns
)]
(35)
The expression for the hypervelocity correction factor is then
CF ijh =
A¯ ijvz,av
Avz,j
(36)
A value of 1 of the correction factor corresponds to no shielding, while a
value of 0 indicates that the target component is not visible by the impactor.
In the case of the ballistic regime, the same approach cannot be used, as
there is no ejecta generation. Looking at Eq. (20), the impact probability
in the ballistic regime depends only on the size of the particle and on the
extent of the target object. As the dimension of the particle cannot change,
only the extent of the target can be changed in order to correct the impact
probability. In the case of a ballistic impact, a corrected target extent is
used, which can be referred to as the visible target area. Using an approach
similar to the hypervelocity case, the section of the shielding components is
projected onto the target plane (Fig. 15). At this point, if these projections
intersect the target component, they are subtracted from it using Boolean
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operations. The procedure is repeated over each grid cell and averaged as
follows:
A¯ijt,av =
1
Ncell
·
Ncell∑
k=1
[
At,j¬
(
Aks,1, ..., A
k
s,n, ..., A
k
s,Ns
)]
(37)
where A¯ijt,av is the average visible target area associated to the j -th vul-
nerable zone and the i -th vector flux element, At,j is the target component
section relative to the j -th vulnerable zone, and Aks,n is the perspective pro-
jection of the n-th shielding component onto the target plane with respect
to the k -th grid cell. The expression for the ballistic correction factor is then
CF ijb =
A¯ ijt,av
At,j
(38)
Again, as in Section 4.3, the correction factors are converted to their
linearised counterparts as lengths are used in the standard procedure for the
computation of the impact probability (Eq. (17)). The linearised version
is again obtained using Eq. (34), giving the following expressions for the
correction factors in the hypervelocity and ballistic regimes.
CF ijh =
d¯ijvz,av
dvz,j
(39)
CF ijb =
d¯ijt,av
dijtarget
(40)
Finally, the hypervelocity and the ballistic correction factors can be ap-
plied to the computation of the impact probabilities as follows:
P ijcomp,h =
d¯ ijejecta
lvz,j
· CF ijh (41)
P ijcomp,b =
CF ijb · d ijtarget + dp,i
lvz,j
(42)
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5. Comparison with DRAMA and ESABASE2/DEBRIS
To verify the validity of the approach described in Sections 3 and 4, a
comparison with two state-of-the-art software packages has been performed.
ESABASE2/DEBRIS and ESA DRAMA have been considered. DRAMA
performs a simplified vulnerability analysis through its dedicated module
MASTER-based Impact Flux and Damage Assessment Software (MIDAS)
(Gelhaus et al., 2014, 2013; Martin et al., 2005b,a). The analysis of MIDAS
is limited to the outer structure of the spacecraft (no internal components
can be considered). The user can analyse the debris and meteoroid fluxes and
damage for any user-defined target orbit and particle size range. The analy-
sis can be performed for a spherical target, a random tumbling plate, or up
to ten oriented surfaces can be defined. The user can select the orientation,
area, density, and type of shielding of the panels. There are four hard-coded
damage equations and up to 20 can be defined. The debris population uses
the fluxes distributions provided by ESA-MASTER. The collision flux analy-
sis performed by MIDAS provides information about impacting particles and
the probability of collision for each of the defined surfaces separately. For
this analysis MIDAS uses a reference area Sref . This area is the cross-section
for spherical objects and randomly tumbling plate. For oriented surfaces,
the surface areas of each panel are the reference areas. Given the simulation
time ∆T , and the impact flux ϕ generated by MASTER, MIDAS computes
the number of impacts Nimp as follows
Nimp = ϕ · Sref ·∆T (43)
From which follows the impact probability
Pimp = 1− e−Nimp (44)
The value of ∆T is computed as the difference between the start and the
end epoch defined by the user. Alongside the impact analysis, MIDAS also
performs a damage assessment for oriented surfaces. To do so, it uses the
failure flux provided by MASTER, which is the flux of particles penetrating
the surface. Similarly to the collision analysis, the number of penetrations
Npen and the penetration probability Ppen are computed as follows
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Npen = ϕfail · Sref ·∆T (45)
Ppen = 1− e−Npen (46)
The failure flux ϕfail is generated in a special plug-in routine of MASTER
where the BLEs are applied.
ESABASE2/DEBRIS is a more complex software, which allows the user
to build an arbitrarily complex structure. The methodology used by ESABASE2
is based on a ray-tracing method, but no debris-cloud propagation is taken
into account. However, the vulnerability of internal components can still be
analysed by using a particular workaround: the outer structure is removed
and the user has to provide manually the type of shielding and the stand-
off distances for each panel of the internal structure. The presented model,
instead, automatically detects the characteristics of the outer structure and
assigns the proper stand-off distance and shielding configurations.
5.1. Test case: Cubic structure in SSO orbit
The first comparison (Trisolini et al., 2018a) is aimed at verifying the
main building blocks of the model, such as the representation of the environ-
ment through vector flux elements, the implementation of the ballistic limit
equations, and the computation of the impact and penetration probabilities
through the approach outlined in Section 2.4 and the use of the concept of
critical flux. A standard scenario has been selected, where the impact and
penetration probabilities are computed for an aluminium Al-6061-T6 cubic-
shaped object with 1 m side length and 2 mm thickness. The characteristics
of the material are summarised in Table 2.
Table 2: Material properties for aluminium Al-6061-T6.
ρm (kg/m
3) HB C(m/s) σy (MPa)
2713 95 5100 276
The mission considered is a 1-year mission in a SSO with altitude equal
to 802 km, inclination of 98.6 degrees, and eccentricity of 0.001 with starting
epoch on the 1st of January 2016. The ballistic limit equation used is the
Cour-Palais thin wall (Ryan and Christiansen, 2010). The discretisation
used for the vector flux elements is summarised in Table 3. Either the bin
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location or the number of bins has been specified, alongside the considered
boundaries.
Table 3: Binning used for the generation of the vector flux elements .
Variable Bounds Binning
dp 0.0001 − 0.1 m 200
vp 0 − 20 km/s 40
El -90◦ − 90◦ Every 15
◦ in [ -90◦, -30◦ ) ∪ ( 30◦, 90◦ ]
Every 10◦ in [ -30◦, 30◦ ]
Az -180◦ − 180◦
Every 30◦ in [ -180◦, -90◦ ] ∪ [ 90◦, 180◦ ]
Every 15◦ in ( -90◦, -45◦ ] ∪ [ 45◦, 90◦ )
Every 5◦ in ( -45◦, 45◦ )
The resulting comparison for the number of impacts and penetration is
summarised in Table 4 and Table 5 respectively.
Table 4: Comparison between the numbers of impacts for a cubic structure.
Panel DRAMA ESABASE Model
Lead 69.473 80.58 69.47
Space 0.48114 2.176 1.078
Trail 0.032326 0.0222 0.032
Earth 0.54294 2.517 1.259
Right 19.196 21.78 19.17
Left 21.953 27.96 21.975
Total 111.678406 135.0352 112.998
A good agreement is observed between the developed model and DRAMA,
with results that differ from about 1 impact and 0.1 penetrations per year,
which are comparable to other analyses (Miller et al., 2017). The results
of the ESABASE2 simulations instead show a higher number of both pre-
dicted impacts and penetrations with respect to the other two software pack-
ages. This difference may be explained with ESABASE2 using a different
MASTER-2009 population. Nonetheless, the higher number of penetrations
in ESABASE2 can then be directly connected to the higher number of im-
pacts. The difference with DRAMA is not substantial but still deserves an
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Table 5: Comparison between the numbers of penetrations for a cubic structure.
Panel DRAMA ESABASE Model
Lead 0.2887 0.2868 0.276
Space 1.71E-05 5.65E-05 2.12E-05
Trail 7.60E-11 5.26E-08 1.03E-06
Earth 1.73E-05 5.05E-05 1.99E-05
Right 0.01027 0.0164 0.0067
Left 0.01 0.0203 0.0076
Total 0.3090 0.3235 0.2913
analysis. In fact, this is focused only on two of the faces (Earth and Space),
while the others have almost identical results. This difference can be traced
back to the discretisation employed in the generation of the vector flux ele-
ments (Table 3) combined with the strongly directional nature of the fluxes
in SSO orbits. The impacts on these two faces are mainly a function of the
impact elevation angle. As this has a stronger directionality than the az-
imuth, it is more susceptible to the discretisation used. Given the adopted
discretisation in the impact elevation, it may not be able to predict the fluxes
on the Earth and Space faces as well as for the other ones.
5.2. Test case: Single child component in SSO orbit
Once the general procedure has been verified with a standard test case
against DRAMA and ESABASE2/DEBRIS, the model has been tested also
for the computation of the vulnerability of internal components. For this
test case, only a comparison with ESABASE2/DEBRIS could be performed
as DRAMA does not support such an analysis. First, the model is tested
for a configuration with a single internal component. A cubic-shaped parent
object made of aluminium Al-6061-T6 with a 1 m side length and a 1 mm
wall thickness has been selected. The child component contained in the
parent is box-shaped, made of the same material, with a side length of 40
cm, and a wall thickness of 1 mm. The mission scenario is the same as
the previous test case (Section 5.1). The ballistic limit equation used is the
ESABASE Double Wall (Ga¨de and Miller, 2013). Fig. 17 shows the results
of the comparison between ESABASE2/DEBRIS and different options of the
developed model. The different options presented are the standard vulnerable
zone approach (Section 3) identified with the label Standard, the correction
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factor methodology (Section 4.4), the impact ejecta methodology considering
the areas (Sections 4.1 and 4.2) identified by the label Shielding, and the
linearised version of the impact ejecta method (Section 4.3) identified by the
label Linear shielding. Given the difference between the impacts predicted by
this model and ESABASE2/DEBRIS (Table 4), it was decided to compare
the ratio between the number of penetrations and the number of impacts on
the outer structure, instead of directly comparing the number of penetrations.
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Figure 17: Comparison for one internal component.
Fig. 17 show that all the models predict a penetration ratio that is of
the same order of magnitude. The model predicting the largest amount of
penetrations is the standard vulnerable zone methodology. This is expected
as this methodology is an intrinsically conservative procedure. Also expected
is the behaviour of the correction factor methodology, which replicates the
results of the standard formulation as no shielding components are present in
the test case, resulting in a value of 1 for the correction factors of Eqs. (39)
and (40). The two versions of the ejecta model instead exhibit quite a dif-
ferent behaviour, with the linearised version showing the best agreement
with ESABASE2/DEBRIS, while the version with the areas clearly gives
the lowest result. This difference can be expected: both models rely on the
same computational procedure to evaluate the interactions between the de-
bris ejecta and the shielding components; however, the linearisation process
increases the computed value of Pcloud as the ratio between the areas will
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always be lower than the ratio between the associated equivalent lengths.
5.3. Test case: Two children components in SSO orbit
For the final comparison, a parent structure with two internal components
is considered. The parent structure is a 2m × 1m × 1m aluminium Al-
6061-T6 box with a 1 mm wall thickness. The two internal components
are two identical box-shaped objects with a 40 cm side length and a 1 mm
wall thickness. The first box (Component 1 ) is in the centre of the parent
structure, while the second box (Component 2 ), is positioned in front of the
first one along the RAM direction at a distance of 0.2 m from the outer face
(Fig. 18). Again, the mission scenario is equivalent to the one of Section 5.1.
x
y
Comp. 1
Comp. 2
External
structure
40 cm
20 cm 20 cm
Figure 18: Schematics of the satellite geometry used for the mutual shielding comparison
with ESABASE2/DEBRIS.
This comparison is used to test the capability of the code to deal with
shielding components (Section 4). For the comparison, the ratio between the
penetrations on the lead face of Component 1 and Component 2 is presented
in Fig. 19.
Fig. 19 shows that, as expected, the standard formulation is not able
to correctly model the vulnerability of internal components when shielding
needs to be considered. In fact, Component 1 has even more penetrations
than Component 2. In this methodology, the two components are treated
separately and Component 1 receives more penetration because the overall
extent of the vulnerable zone is larger than the one of Component 2 as it is
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Figure 19: Comparison for two internal components.
positioned further away from the external face of the structure. The remain-
ing three methodologies, instead, are all capable of comping with mutual
shielding. The results of Fig. 19 shows that the correction factor model is
the most conservative as it predicts a higher fraction of penetration between
the two components. Similarly to Fig. 17, the ejecta model using the ar-
eas (Shielding) is the least conservative and predicts a considerably lower
amounts of penetrations for Component 1. Finally, the linearised version of
the ejecta model more closely matches the results of ESABAS2/DEBRIS. An
interesting aspect of both the comparisons presented in Figs. 17 and 19 is the
significant difference between the procedure using area intersection for the
assessment of the mutual shielding and the correspondent linearised version.
As previously mentioned, this behaviour is expected. What is less expected
is the better agreement of the linearised version with state-of-the-art soft-
ware packages, rather than a more natural implementation based on the
intersection of sections. This suggests that an extent-based computational
methodology should be favoured over an area-based one for the implementa-
tion of a vulnerable zone-based computation of the vulnerability. This is in
agreement with the idea of this work that is to extend the original vulnera-
ble zone methodology, whose probability assessment ultimately relies on an
extent-based procedure.
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5.4. Execution time
This section contains a summary of the execution time of the presented
methodology for the test cases presented in Sections 5.1 to 5.3 (Table 6).
The tests have been run on a system equipped with an i7-8700 CPU @ 3.2
GHz with 6 cores and 16 GB of RAM. Our model uses pre-computed flux
distributions from MASTER, and its execution time is not included in the
runtime.
Table 6: Execution time for the presented test cases (average over 10 simulations).
Test case Runtime
Test 1 0.53 s
Test 2 - Correction factor 0.59 s
Test 2 - Linear shielding 2 1.16 s
Test 3 - Correction factor 0.69 s
Test 3 - Linear shielding 5.56 s
6. Conclusions and Discussion
The paper has presented the development of a novel methodology to pre-
dict the vulnerability of spacecraft configurations to the impact with debris
particles, with particular attention to devising a methodology for taking into
account mutual shielding effects between internal components. The method
has its foundations in the concept of the vulnerable zone and builds on it
to obtain a statistically robust procedure for survivability assessments. A
complete description of the main building blocks and methodologies imple-
mented in the model has been given. A novel procedure for the computation
of the mutual shielding contribution to the damage to internal components
has been presented, based on the geometrical interaction between the sec-
ondary debris ejecta, modelled as conic shapes and the shielding and target
components. The overall methodology has been tested and compared with
state of the art software packages, showing very good agreement with tradi-
tional impact assessment methodologies. Such a comparison served also as a
verification test for the fully probabilistic approach adopted, where the pen-
etration probability is computed as the product of the probabilities of three
2The execution time for the Shielding and Linear shielding cases are equivalent
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separate events. Also, the mutual shielding capabilities have been compared
with ESABASE2/DEBRIS, showing comparable results and demonstrating
that it is possible to predict the mutual shielding between components using
the interaction of geometrical shapes and avoiding ray tracing methodologies.
Alongside the obtained results, it should be mentioned that the presented
methodologies is in its initial level of development and has been verified
against limited test cases and scenarios. Consequently, for future devel-
opment, a more complete set of tests should be executed, including more
complex internal configurations, with an increasing number of components
and different shapes. This is especially useful for verifying the adaptability
and scalability of the mutual shielding procedure to more complicated ge-
ometries. Moreover, different shielding methodologies should also be tested,
specifically including honeycomb sandwich panels as they are among the most
used spacecraft structures.
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Appendix A. Material database
In Table A.7 are summarised the values of the coefficients for the SRL
BLE for the two different cases of Aluminium outer bumper plate and CFRP
outer bumper plate (Christiansen et al., 2009).
Table A.7: Summary of the coefficients for the SRL BLE
Symbol Aluminium outer bumper CFRP outer bumper
VLV 3 km/s 4.2 km/s
VHV 7 km/s 8.4 km/s
K3S 1.4 1.1
K3D 0.4 0.4
Ktw 1.5 1
KS2 0.1 1
β 2/3 1/3
δ
4/3 if 45◦ ≥ θ ≥ 65◦
4/3 if 45◦ ≤ θ ≤ 65◦ 4/3

8/3 if 45◦ ≥ θ ≥ 65◦
10/4 if 45◦ ≤ θ ≤ 65◦ 0
γ 1/3 2/3
45
